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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
LEFfIST?
Louis Michael
Michael Seidman'
Seidman *

Mark Tushnet has been my friend and mentor for over thirty-five
thirty-five
years. For a substantial part of that time, to its permanent discredit,
much of the legal academy remained
remained ignorant of or, worse, dismissive of
of
his prodigious accomplishments.
accomplishments. I admire Tushnet for many reasons,
but one of them is because
because of his persistence
persistence and integrity during the
long years when many legal academics refused to take him seriously. I
have written previously
previously about the ways in which his personal
personal and
me.'I On this
professional commitments have served as a model for me.
occasion, rather
rather than repeating what I have already said, I think that the
achievements is by giving a portion of
most appropriate way to honor his achievements
of
his work the kind of sustained
sustained and serious attention that it should have
received in the past.
received
The question
question that I have asked in the title of this Essay is also a
kind of tribute to Tushnet. One of the reasons legal academics
academics did not
take Tushnet seriously in the early part of his career was because of his
uncompromising commitment to leftism.
uncompromising
Although he has not
abandoned
that
commitment,
in
the
latter
part
his career
of
career he has also
abandoned
latter
idiosyncratic, but a
committed himself to a version-characteristically
version-characteristically idiosyncratic,
nonetheless-of constitutionalism.
version nonetheless--of
constitutionalism.
His case
for
constitutionalism is set out in his powerful
powerful and subtle book, Taking the
2
ConstitutionAway
Constitution
Away from the Courts,
Courts,2 which I will use as the basis for this
Essay. Does this book succeed in reconciling constitutionalism
constitutionalism with
leftism?

**

Carmack Waterhouse
Law, Georgetown
University Law
Law
Cannack
Waterhouse Professor
Professor of
of Constitutional
Constitutional Law,
Georgetown University
characteristic generosity,
generosity, Mark
Center. With
With characteristic
Mark Tushnet helped me sharpen
sharpen the arguments
arguments I
make here. I also received help from Lama Abu-Odeh,
Abu-Odeh, Randy Barnett, David Fontana, Judith
Mazo, and participants at the Quinnipiac
Quinnipiac Law School Colloquium on the work of Mark
Tushnet. I am especially grateful to James
James Branda and Richard Harris
Harris for outstanding
outstanding
research assistance.
1. See Louis Michael
Tushnet: AA Personal
1.
Michael Seidman, Mark
Mark Tushnet:
Personal Reminiscence, 90 GEO.
L.J.127
L.1.127 (2001).
(2001).
2.

MARK
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION A
AWAY
MARK TUSHNET,
TUSHNET, TAKING
WAY FROM
FROM THE COURTS
COURTS (2000).
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If there is anyone
anyone who could accomplish
accomplish that task, it is Tushnet. He
is without question our most thoughtful
thoughtful constitutional
constitutional leftist. Yet, I
argue
argue in this Essay, the book, at least taken at face value, fails to achieve
achieve
its goal. To the extent that the book argues for constitutionalism,
constitutionalism, it
abandons
abandons leftism, and to the extent it is leftist, it abandons
constitutionalism.
Tushnet's
Tushnet's proposal
proposal can be both leftist and
constitutional
reconceiving what constitutionalism
constitutional only by reconceiving
constitutionalism amounts to in
ways I suggest at the conclusion
conclusion of the Essay. The failure to reconcile
leftism with constitutionalism
constitutionalism as it is more commonly understood
teaches
teaches us something important:
important: if Tushnet cannot produce
produce this
synthesis,
synthesis, then no one can.
I. TUSHNET'S
TUSHNET'S THESIS

Taking the Constitution
Constitution Away from the Courts
Courts is a
The thesis of Taking
good deal more subtle and complex
pugnacious title implies.
complex than its pugnacious
Still, the broad outlines of Tushnet'
Tushnet' s position are easy to summarize.
summarize. He
argues for a populist
populist constitutionalism, which would "treat[]
constitutional
constitutional law not as something in the hands of lawyers
lawyers and judges
but in the hands of the people themselves.',3
themselves." 3 On a populist conception,
"the
collectively, as we act together in
"the Constitution
Constitution belongs to us collectively,
political dialogue . . . in the streets, in the voting booths, or in
legislatures as representatives
others." 4 This populist image stands in
legislatures
representatives of others.,,4
sharp contrast to traditional constitutionalism,
constitutionalism, which is the special
preserve of judges deliberately shielded from popular control. Hence,
experiment with the
Tushnet calls for an end to our two-century long experiment
judicial review of statutes; he calls for us to finally "take
"take the
courts."
Constitution away from the courts."
Tushnet's proposal is subject to two obvious and interlocking
interlocking
objections. First, opponents
opponents will argue that politicians
politicians cannot
cannot be trusted
long-term constitutional
constitutional commitments,
commitments, especially when
to fulfill our long-term
they run up against immediate political imperatives.
imperatives. Second, opponents
will claim that ordinary
ordinary politicians lack the expertise and interest to
work through the baffling complexities
complexities of constitutional
constitutional doctrine. s5
3. Id.
Id. at 182.
4. Id.
Id. at 181.
181.
See, e.g., Cornelia
Constitution in
5. See,
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise
Promise of the Constitution
Executive Hands,
680 (2005) ("There are reasons to question whether
Hands, 103
103 MICH. L. REV. 676,
676,680
whether
equipped to guide and constrain
constrain its own policy
policy objectives by
by
the executive
executive branch is itself equipped
elsewhere, or its
attending, for example, to the Constitution's allocation
allocation of some powers elsewhere,
limitations on governmental power
power in recognition of individual rights.").
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A good part of Tushnet's book is devoted to a detailed and largely
convincing refutation of these objections. The refutation begins with a
constitutionalism about which we should be
definition of the kind of constitutionalism
concerned. There is no reason, Tushnet claims, to bind ourselves to all
the details of the "thick" constitution. 66 What matters-what constitutes
us as a nation and commands our respect-is not the deadening
deadening minutiae
"thin" constitution, which consists of the
of constitutional law, but the "thin"
ideals embodied in the Declaration of Independence
Independence and the
Constitution's Preamble.77
Tushnet powerfully
powerfully argues that ordinary political
political actors have the
incentive and ability to enforce the thin constitution. On the one hand,
elected politicians
politicians no less than the courts can feel the tug of
constitutional obligation-a
"overhang"
constitutional
obligation-a fact presently obscured by the "overhang"
of judicial review, which leads to dependence
dependence on courts for
constitutional enforcement. There
constitutional
There are also built-in political incentives
enforcement of constitutional rights.8s On the other
favoring political enforcement
clear-eyed review of the spotty history of judicial
enforcement of
of
hand, a clear-eyed
judicial enforcement
constitutional
values
suggests
that
constitutional
we would be giving up very little if
we took judges out of the constitution business.9
II.
THE PROBLEM
CONSTITUTIONALISM PURPORTS
II. THE
PROBLEM THAT
THAT CONSTITUTIONALISM
PURPORTS TO SOLVE
SOLVE

Is Tushnet's case convincing?
convincing? We cannot answer that question
without
asking
another
one:
Exactly what problem is constitutionalism
without asking
constitutionalism
supposed to solve? It turns
turns out that there are at least
least two different
different
problems, and that people engaged
engaged in constitutional theorizing
theorizing often talk
past each other because
because they are not talking
talking about
about the same problem.
One
project
for
constitutionalism
creation of political
One project
constitutionalism is the creation
arrangements that will promote substantive justice. We
arrangements
We might call this
Most of the great
substantive constitutionalism.
great goals of the
Constitution's
Constitution's Preamble
Preamble that form the center
center of Tushnet's thin
constitution-to
"establish
Justice
...
promote
the general
general Welfare,
constitution-to "establish
...
Welfare, and
0
Liberty"'° -address this problem. A theorist
secure the Blessings of Liberty"lO-address
6.
6. TUSHNET,
TUSHNET, supra
supra note
note 2, at 9 ("The
("The thick
thick Constitution
Constitution contains a lot of detailed
provisions
"[w]e can
to be organized
organized ....
.... ").
"). In contrast, "[w]e
provisions describing
describing how
how the
the government
government is to
think
think of
of the thin
thin Constitution
Constitution as its fundamental guarantees
guarantees of
of equality, freedom
freedom of
of
expression, and liberty
liberty ......"
" Id.
Id. at
at 11.
II.
7. Id.
Id. at9-14.
at 9-14.
8. Id.
Id. at
at 95-128.
95-128.
9.
TUSHNET, supra
supra note
note 2,
2, at 129-53.
129-53.
9. TUSHNET,
10. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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preoccupied with
with this
this first
flrst project
project might
might ask whether
whether a system
system of
of
preoccupied
separated powers
powers best
best protects
protects private
private property,"
property, II whether
whether requiring
requiring
separated
congressional approval
approval for war
war making
making helps
helps to keep
keep the
the peace,1
peace,122 or
or
congressional
religious
vibrant
encourages
whether
the
nonestablishment
religion
encourages
vibrant
religious
of
religion
nonestablishment
whether
13
communities. 13
communities.
second project
project for constitutionalism
constitutionalism starts with
with the observation
observation
A second
everyone in
in our political
political community
community wants
wants to
to protect
protect private
private
that not everyone
of
form
This
religion.
or
encourage
of
property,
avoid
or
encourage
war,
property,
constitutionalism takes
takes as its task
task the
the creation
creation of
of political
political arrangements
arrangements
constitutionalism
command respect and obedience
obedience from people who disagree
disagree
that can command
We
about substantive
substantive justice.
We might call this project
project political
about
14
constitutionalism. 14
reflected in the Preamble's
Preamble's goals of "form[ing]
"form[ing]
It is reflected
constitutionalism.
Union" and "insur[ing]
"insur[ing] domestic Tranquility,,,IS
Tranquility,"' 15 which,
aa more perfect Union"
playa
a role
role in Tushnet's
Tushnet's thin constitution. A
A theorist
theorist
apparently, also play
apparently,
preoccupied with this second project might ask what procedures
procedures or
preoccupied
would be acceptable
acceptable ex ante to people with
allocations of power would
different goals and conceptions
conceptions of the good who nonetheless want to
unified community.
remain within aa unifled
Each form of constitutionalism
constitutionalism has important
important difficulties.
Each
Substantive constitutionalists must confront the problem that any answer
temporally contingent. What
What works in some
they offer is likely to be temporally
times and places to produce
produce substantively
substantively just results will not work in
others. Does judicial
judicial review promote
promote or retard socially just policies?
The answer must be that it depends on who the judges are.
Because
entrenchment,
Because constitutionalism is associated with entrenchment,
"all-or-nothing" answer.
constitutionalists often try to force us into an "all-or-nothing"
of the
the
Elements of
Normative Elements
Costs and the Normative
TransactionCosts
11. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction
11.
471, 503
Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471,
to Constitutional
Constitutional Theory,
Public
Application to
Choice Model:
Model: An Application
Public Choice
separation of powers raises transaction costs and thereby hinders the
(1988) (arguing that separation
(1988)
legislation).
passage of redistributive legislation).
Convention
of the Constitutional Convention
12.
12. For example, George Mason argued on the floor of
not [safely] to be
the Executive, because not
"giving the power of war to the
that he was against "giving
it. He
He was for
constructed as to be entitled to it.
not so constructed
trusted with
with it; or
or to the Senate, because not
peace." 22 THE RECORDS OF THE
for facilitating
facilitating peace."
war; but for
facilitating war;
clogging rather than facilitating
in
1966) (modification in
rev. ed. 1966)
Farrand ed., rev.
1787, at 319 (Max Farrand
FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787,
CONVENTION OF
original).
Original).
Clauses,
the Religion
Religion Clauses,
Foundationsof the
PluralisticFoundations
H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic
e.g., Steven
Steven H.
See, e.g.,
13. See,
(2004) (arguing
(arguing that religion clauses prevent government intervention
REV. 99 (2004)
90 CORNELL L. REV.
on government).
dependence on
of risk
risk of dependence
putatively favoring religion
religion because of
while
John Rawls,
Rawls, while
the project undertaken by John
to evoke
evoke the
is meant to
label is
14. This
This label
14.
RAWLS,
JOHN RAWLS,
it. See JOHN
he pursues it.
by which he
means by
specific means
bracketing the specific
simultaneously bracketing
(1993).
POLITICAL LIBERALISM
LIBERALISM (1993).
pmbl.
CONST. pmbl.
15. U.S.
U.S. CONST.
15.
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They want us to commit to a particular
particular arrangement
arrangement because,
because, over
over the
the
They
cases, it will
will produce
produce substantively
substantively just outcomes
outcomes even if, in
range of cases,
range
some times
times and places, alternative
alternative arrangements
arrangements would do better.1
better. 166 But
But
some
formulation begs an important
important question:
question: Why
Why is constitutionalism
constitutionalism
this formulation
Why not use particular
particular institutional
institutional
committed to entrenchment?
entrenchment? Why
committed
arrangements only when,
when, and
and to the extent
extent that, they produce
produce
arrangements
substantively just outcomes?
outcomes?
substantively
The entrenchment
entrenchment question points us toward the second
second difficulty
with substantive
substantive constitutionalism,
constitutionalism, which, in
in turn,
tum, leads to
to
with
constitutionalism's
constitutionalism's political
political version. The problem,
problem, of course, is that we
we
live
live in a society
society where
where there is pervasive
pervasive and
and deep
deep disagreement
disagreement about
issues of substantive
substantive justice. Without
Without that disagreement,
disagreement, we
we could
could
issues
indeed
indeed simply adjust institutions whenever
whenever the
the adjustment
adjustment was likely to
produce
produce the results that we
we all want. In the real world, where
where there is
disagreement, these adjustments will be resisted by the losers they
disagreement,
produce.
produce. The losers will rightly believe that they are playing a game
preserve "domestic
deliberately fixed to make them losers. If we are to preserve
"domestic
deliberately
acceptable to
to
Tranquility,,,177 we must design
design rules for the game
game that are acceptable
Tranquility,"'
everyone,
everyone, and then stick with those rules.
well-known problems
Political
Political constitutionalism
constitutionalism has well-known
problems of its own.
First, it is not obvious why the initial agreement
agreement embedded
embedded in the
Constitution should command
command our respect. The shape
shape of the agreement
Constitution
determined by the entitlements
will be determined
entitlements the parties
parties possess
possess before they
bargaining table. If these entitlements
come to the bargaining
entitlements are unfairly
distributed
distributed at the start, then the resulting agreement will be unfair as
well.
agreement is in some sense fair, it is not
Second, even if the initial agreement
people
to
stick to the deal. If the deal is to make
can
force
clear how we
make
any real difference,
enforced in cases where, but for
difference, it must be enforced
secure its goals respecting
constitutional obligation, a group could secure
substantive justice. Often, people who are unwilling to respect the deal
characterized as "unprincipled,"
in these circumstances
circumstances are characterized
"unprincipled," but this is a
very odd use of the word. These are precisely the people unwilling to
sacrifice their deepest substantive principles for the sake of mere
political justice.

16. Tushnet explicitly adopts this view. See TUSHNET, supra
supra note 2,
2, at 141 ("[W]e
("[W]e
have to remember that we buy judicial review wholesale: In getting the decisions
decisions we like, we
run the risk of decisions we despise.").
17. U.S. CONST.
CON ST. pmbl.
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The problem of enforcement
enforcement is especially acute if constitutions are
entrenched over generations. The people asked to abide by the deal are
then not the people who made the deal. Moreover, the contours of the
deal itself become increasingly indeterminate as society grows further
For example, both
removed from the social conditions that produced it. for
sides of the modern abortion debate are able with equal good faith to
invoke the commands
commands of the equal protection and due process clauses to
support their position on
a question the authors of those commands
18
18
consider.
did not
simply did
not consider.
Taking the Constitution
ConstitutionAway from the Courts
Courts
Which problem does Taking
try to solve? Answering
Answering that question turns out to be quite difficult.
Much of the book is written as if the intended audience shared the
substantive goals of the left. The book argues that courts have done
much less, and political institutions much more, to advance those goals
supposed.' 9 One might think, then, that Tushnet is
than commonly
commonly supposed.1
arguing for a leftist version of substantive
substantive constitutionalism.
constitutionalism.
At several
several points in the book, however, Tushnet seems
seems to explicitly
disclaim this reading of his thesis. In his preface, he explains that his
because populist
book provides a defense of constitutional law because
constitutionalism "is
not
in
the
first
instance
either
the
expression of
"is
of
preferences by officials and voters or the expression
pure preferences
expression of unfiltered
'mere' politics, nor is it 'simply'
'simply'
moral judgments.
judgments. In short, it is not 'mere'
philosophy., 20 Later, he expresses
philosophy.,,2o
expresses doubt that the right question to ask is
18.
Compare, e.g., John A.
Fetal Status:
18. Compare,
A. Robertson, Gestational
Gestational Burdens and Fetal
Status: Justifying
Justifying
Roe v.
Wade, 13
& MED.
Constitution protects a
Roe
v. Wade,
13 AM.
AM. J.
J. L. &
MED. 189, 200 (1987)
(1987) (arguing that
that the Constitution
Approach to the
woman's right
right to abort), with Martin
Martin Rhonheimer,
Rhonheimer, AA Constitutionalist
Constitutionalist Approach
Encyclical Evangelium
Vitae, 43 AM.
135, 148 (1998)
(1998) (arguing that the Constitution
Evangelium Vitae,
AM. J. JURIS.
JURIS. 135,148
protects
protects aa fetus's
fetus's right to fife).
life).
19. See TUSHNET, supra
supra note 2, at 129-33,
129-33, 151.
id. at 152 ("On
151. Compare
Compare id.
("On balance, the
the
question
question of
of whether
whether judicial
judicial review
review benefits
benefits progressive and liberal causes more
more than it harms
harms
them seems rather
id. at 154 ("On balance, eliminating
eliminating [judicial
(judicial review]
review] is
rather difficult."),
difficult."), with id.
likely to
likely
to help
help today's
today's liberals
liberals aa bit more
more than it would hurt them.").
20.
xi.
Tushnet
does not
on his
qualification that populist
20. Id.
[d. at
at xi.
Tushnet does
not elaborate
elaborate on
his qualification
populist
constitutionalism
separated from pure
constitutionalism is separated
pure preferences
preferences and unfiltered moral
moral judgments
judgments only "in
"in
the
the first instance."
instance." In Part
Part IV,
IV, infra, I suggest
suggest a reading
reading of the book that ultimately
ultimately grounds
grounds its
claims
Tushnet's assertion,
assertion, in the
the
claims on
on just
just such
such preferences
preferences and judgments.
judgments. Similarly
Similarly cryptic
cryptic is Tushnet's
following
following paragraph,
paragraph, that
that he is not
not arguing
arguing that
populist
populist interpretation
interpretation is
is the
the only, or even
even the best,
best, interpretation
interpretation of
of the
the
Constitution.
my argument
argument opens
opens up
up issues
issues that thoughtful
thoughtful voters
voters and
and
Constitution. Rather, my
elected
elected officials
officials should
should think
think about,
about, and
and that are obscured
obscured by
by the elitist
constitutional
constitutional law that dominates
dominates contemporary
contemporary legal thought.
TUSHNET,
TUSHNET, supra
supra note
note 2,
2, at
at xi.
xi. This
This passage
passage is deeply
deeply puzzling.
puzzling. If
If Tushnet
Tushnet is
is really not
arguing
interpretation, then why has
has he written a
arguing that
that populist
populist constitutionalism
constitutionalism is the best interpretation,
book-long
of
book-long defense
defense of it?
it? The
The passage
passage at least
least suggests
suggests the
the possibility
possibility that his embrace
embrace of
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"whether liberals or conservatives benefit from judicial review,"
"whether
review," and
"[w]e might try to evaluate
suggests that "[w]e
evaluate judicial
judicial review in a principled
rather than a political
political way.'
way.,,21 In addition, in an important footnote,
Tushnet explains that although his "argument
"argument takes as its audience
review," that is "largely
liberal supporters of judicial
judicial review,"
"largely because they have
conclusion that
been [its] most prominent defenders,"
defenders," and that his conclusion
judicial review "makes
"makes rather little difference, is equally
applicable to
22
critics--of judicial
conservative defenders-or
conservative
defenders-or critics-of
judicial review."
review.'.22
In Part III, I will assume that Tushnet favors a political
political constitution
conclude that
and ask whether
whether his political constitutionalism
constitutionalism is leftist. I conclude
it is not. Ultimately, though, for reasons that I will make clear, I do not
think that this is the best reading
reading of the argument. Accordingly,
Accordingly, Part IV
evaluates the substantive version
evaluates
version of his thesis. That version purports to
be leftist, but I have some doubts as to whether it really is. Moreover, to
the extent that it is in fact leftist, I argue that it forsakes the goals of
of
constitutionalism. A brief conclusion, in Part V,
V, suggests
suggests a way of
of
reformulating constitutionalism
Tushnet'ss proposal both
reformulating
constitutionalism so as to make Tushnet'
leftist and constitutionalist.
constitutionalist.
III. TUSHNET'S POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION

The main problem with a leftist version of political
constitutionalism should be obvious from what I have already written. A
subordinate the
leftist adherent to a political constitution must subordinate
substantive
goals
of
the
left
whenever
they
come
into
conflict with
substantive
constitutional commitments.
emphasize again that
constitutional
commitments. It is important to emphasize
these constitutional
constitutional commitments
commitments will take hold at precisely
precisely the moment
moment
when leftist goals are within reach, because
because if they are not within reach,
reach,
the constitutional
constitutional commitments
are
irrelevant.
Suppose,
for
example,
commitments
example,
that the political constitution
constitution prohibits redistribution of property to the
dispossessed. This prohibition will hardly matter to leftists as long as
they lack the power to effect
effect such redistribution. At the moment they
have the power, though, political constitutionalism
constitutionalism requires that they
achievement for the sake of an agreement
forego this achievement
agreement that purports to be
politically
politically neutral as between
between left and right. What kind of a leftist would
do that?

populist
constitutionalism is conditioned on its efficacy in achieving the goals of the left-a
populist constitutionalism
left-a
infra in Part IV.
possibility that is also explored infra
IV.
21.
supra note 2,
21. TUSHNET,
TUSHNET, supra
2, at 152.
ld. at 215 n.3.
22. [d.
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In one sense, this problem
problem is not confined to leftist adherents to a
political constitution.
Such a constitution
constitution forces people
people of all
substantive persuasions to subordinate their substantive
substantive views to
constitutional
problem is especially acute for the left,
constitutional requirements. The problem
though, because the left has typically not been at the table when the
agreements were formulated. Marxists and advocates
Critical Legal
advocates of Critical
Studies (who did not exist at the time), not to mention women,
women, people
people of
color, and the poor (who existed in great numbers), were conspicuous by
their absence from Philadelphia in 1787.
libertarian scholar
Conservatives
Conservatives have it much easier. For example, libertarian
Randy Barnett
Barnett defends originalism and constitutional
constitutional obligation
obligation even in
circumstances when this approach
circumstances
approach conflicts with the substantive goals of
23
23
libertarianism.
He
does
so, however, precisely because of his view that
libertarianism.
advances libertarian
libertarian goals. For just
the Constitution, taken as a whole, advances
the reason that Barnett favors constitutional
constitutional obligation, leftists should
oppose it, at least if Barnett
Barnett is right about the Constitution's
Constitution's ideological
valence.
Of course, Tushnet does not defend the same political constitution
constitution
that Barnett defends. Tushnet's thin, populist constitution does not
Perhaps, then, the thin
prohibit the redistribution
redistribution of property.
constitution functions in the same way for leftists that the thick
constitution functions for libertarians
libertarians like Barnett. But just as a leftist
should not sign on to Barnett's
Barnett's constitution, so too a conservative
conservative should
not sign on to Tushnet's. If in fact Tushnet's constitution tilts the
playing field toward
toward the left, then it is substantive
substantive rather than political,
substantive views will not agree to it.
and those with different
different substantive
One might respond to this argument by claiming that I have ignored
ignored
just how thin the populist constitution
constitution is. Perhaps the left and right can
both agree
agree to Tushnet's constitution because
because it establishes very little. At
of
some points,
points, Tushnet suggests
suggests as much with respect to the abolition of
judicial review. Tushnet points out that over the course of our history,
judicial review has rarely produced results that vary much from those
political actors:
that would have been produced
produced in any event by powerful
powerful'24
around zero.
noise around
to noise
"judicial review basically amounts to
zero.,,24
If judicial review amounts to very little, then it follows that its
abolition would not amount to much either, and if this is true, then left
23. See RANDY E. BARNETT,
BARNEIT, RESTORING
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY
LIBERTY 89-117 (2005).
changes, sometimes
sometimes
24. TUSHNET,
2, at
24.
TUSHNET, supra
supra note
note 2,
at 153
153 ("It
("It offers
offers essentially
essentially random
random changes,
good and sometimes bad, to what the political system produces.").
produces.").
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and right
right can
can agree
agree to the proposal.
proposal. But
But why,
why, then, would
would Tushnet
Tushnet
and
bother to
to write aa book
book arguing
arguing for
for its
its abolition?
abolition? Tushnet's
Tushnet's answer
answer isis that
that
bother
abolition "may
"may contribute
contribute to serious
serious thinking
thinking about the Constitution
Constitution
abolition
2 5 Abolition,
courtS.,,25
Abolition, in other
other words, clears
clears the
the way
way for
for
outside the
the courts.
outside
Whether or not
not substantive
substantive outcomes
outcomes changed,
changed, the "people
"people
populism. Whether
themselves" would
would be
be involved
involved in the
the task of
of constitutional
constitutional construction.
construction.
themselves"
Moreover, this
this populism
populism is
is political
political rather
rather than
than substantive
substantive because
because the
Moreover,
sweeping language
language of the
the Declaration
Declaration and the
the Constitution's
Constitution's Preamble,
Preamble,
sweeping
which give content
content to
to the thin
thin Constitution,
Constitution, are capacious
capacious enough
enough to
to
which
of both
both right and left.
encompass the
the programs
programs of
encompass
I have some
some sympathy
sympathy for a constitution
constitution of this sort. Indeed, I have
have
sufficiently
written a book-length
book-length defense of a version
version of a constitution sufficiently
written
26
elastic to allow all sides of
of political
political disputes
disputes to claim
claim it as
as their
their own. 26
elastic
For
For the reasons
reasons that follow, however,
however, Tushnet's
Tushnet's effort to marry
marry a thin
thin
constitution to leftism and populism
populism leads to a dilemma. Either the thin
constitution constrains
constrains or it does not. To the extent that it constrains,
constrains, it
it
is not leftist.
constrain,
does
not
it
that
the
extent
is not populist,
populist, and to
extent
meaningfully constrains
Assume first that the thin constitution
constitution meaningfully
constrains
political actors. Imagine
Imagine as well that judicial
judicial review has been abolished
abolished
people
and that the constitution has been left "in the hands of the people
27
Tushnet's
themselves.,,27
Would such a regime be populist? Oddly, Tushnet's
themselves.,
demonstrate why it would not be. Tushnet takes as
own argument helps demonstrate
one of his targets a group of legal scholars and practitioners
practitioners who
formulated a set of guidelines designed
designed to constrain what one of them
them
28
called "amendmentitis,,,28
that is, the adoption of what in their view were
"amendmentitis,
29
unnecessary, unwise, or poorly drafted constitutional
constitutional amendments.
amendments?9
Tushnet thinks that this effort to constrain the amendment
amendment process was
elitist because
because it attempted to take constitutional politics out of the hands
of the people.33o°
something very odd about this argument. At first blush, at
There is something
doing
least, it would seem that the authors of the guidelines were doing
review" may
about aa world
world without judicial review"
"[tihinking about
174 (noting
(noting that "[t]hinking
25. [d.
Id. at 174
25.
of constitutional responsibility throughout the
distribution of
the distribution
contribute to the
the goal
goal of the
population).
DEFENSE
NEW DEFENSE
CONSTITUTION: A NEW
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION:
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETILED
26.
26. See LOUIS
(2001).
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
at 182.
182.
supranote 2, at
27. Tushnet, supra
1995, at
at 20.
AM. PROSPECT,
PROSPECT, Fall 1995,
Amendmentitis, AM.
ConstitutionalAmendmentitis,
Sullivan, Constitutional
28. Kathleen Sullivan,
these
authored these
that authored
for the
the group that
advisor for
was the
the legal
legal advisor
here that II was
must note here
29. II must
AND EXTRAORDINARY
EXTRAORDINARY
GREAT AND
THE CONSTITUTION,
CONSTITUTION, GREAT
FOR THE
See CmZENS
CITIZENS FOR
guidelines.
See
(1999).
CHANGE (1999).
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES
GUIDELINES FOR
179-80.
2, at 179-80.
TUSHNET, supra
supranote 2,
30. TuSHNET,
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precisely what Tushnet recommends. After all, they were not going to
courts and asking judges to enforce their version of constitutional
obligation. Instead, just as Tushnet urges, they were using ordinary
political processes to convince the public that the thin constitution was
inconsistent with the sorts of amendments
amendments then being considered?'
considered. 3 '
And yet there is surely something to Tushnet's
Tushnet's claim that advocacy
advocacy
of the guidelines was in tension with populist constitutionalism. Even
though "the people" were the ultimate arbiters of whether
whether the guidelines
should be followed, the guideline authors were insisting that failure to
follow them was in some sense illegitimate because such a failure would
be inconsistent with constitutional obligation. That insistence was antipopulist in the sense that it denied the legitimacy of decisions that "the
themselves" might otherwise have made.
people themselves"
II think that this example demonstrates that Tushnet has
misdiagnosed
inconsistent
misdiagnosed the problem. It is not judicial review that is inconsistent
with populism, but rather constitutionalism
itself.
Judicial
review
is one
constitutionalism
way to enforce constitutional obligation,
obligation, but unless one denies
constitutional
enforced
constitutional obligation itself, the obligation would have
have to be enforced
in some other
review-perhaps, for
other way in the absence
absence of judicial review-perhaps,
example, by elites intimidating
intimidating people into believing that high principle
32
makes their first-order choices illegitimate.
illegitimate?2
But to the extent that it is
enforced, whether by judicial
judicial review
review or by some other means, the
"people themselves"
themselves" will
be constrained,
constrained, and
and the
the Constitution
"people
will be
Constitution will not be
populist.
Perhaps, then, the thin constitution
constitution is not meant to constrain. On
this view, it requires no more than that people think seriously and deeply
deeply
about their political
judgments,
and
in
no
way
dictates
their
substantive
political judgments,
substantive
content. Such a constitution would be populist, at least in a certain
certain
sense, but it would not be leftist. At first, this assertion may seem odd.
31.
31. The guideline authors
authors acknowledged
acknowledged that there were not formal legal constraints
constraints on
on
"even dominant
dominant
constitutional amendments,
amendments, but identified
identified themselves with the position
position that "even
majorities
CITIZENS FOR
FOR THE
THE CONSTITUTION,
CONSTITUTION, supra
majorities should
should hesitate
hesitate before
before using this
this power."
power." CITIZENS
note
note 29,
29, at
at 1-2.
1-2. Their
Their stated
stated ambition
ambition for the
the guidelines
guidelines was to "draw
"draw attention
attention to some
aspects
aspects of
of the amendment
amendment process
process that
that have been
been ignored
ignored too frequently
frequently ...
. . . , provoke
provoke
discussion
discussion of
of when
when resort
resort to
to the
the amending process
process is
is appropriate,
appropriate, and
and ...... suggest an
an approach
approach
that
that ensures
ensures that
that all
all relevant
relevant concerns
concerns are fully
fully debated."
debated." Id.
[d. at
at 6.
6.
32.
32. One
One might claim
claim that
that this sort
sort of argument
argument ought
ought not to count
count as enforcement
enforcement so
so
long
long as
as the
the people
people retain
retain the right
right to ignore the argument.
argument. But
But if
if this is true, why
why does
Tushnet
made by
Tushnet think
think that
that the
the argument
argument made
by opponents
opponents of
of "amendmentitis"
"amendmentitis" is
is anti-populist?
anti-populist?
More
the people
to the
the point,
point, if
if the
people really
really are
are free to ignore the argument, then
then constitutional
constitutional
More to
obligation
in which
which case,
case, for reasons explained
explained in the
the next
next paragraph
paragraph of
of
obligation does
does not
not constrain,
constrain, in
text,
constitution is not leftist.
text, Tushnet's
Tushnet's constitution
leftist.
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From time immemorial,
immemorial, the rhetoric of the left has been about
about
empowering
disempowering elites. The trouble, though,
empowering the people
people and disempowering
is that "the
"the people" is an abstraction.
abstraction. There is not a "people"
"people" of the
United
United States, but different people, with different
different ends engaged
engaged in a
political
political struggle
struggle for primacy.
primacy. There is no a priori
priori reason to think that
leftists will always win that struggle. When they lose, rhetoric about the
will of the "people"
"people" is anti-leftist.
of
The matter is further complicated
complicated by the fact that there is no way of
measuring
"general will" without
measuring or discovering
discovering the "general
without filtering it through
institutional structures
structures that at once give it expression
expression and distort it. We
can think of these structures as consisting of both political institutions
and extra-political
extra-political distributions of power.
Consider first political
political institutions. Tushnet conflates the will of
the people with outcomes produced by real bodies
bodies like the House of
Representatives,
Representatives, the United
United States Senate, and state
state legislatures.
legislatures. But
why these institutions? Relying on Madisonian
Madisonian theory, Tushnet
Tushnet goes to
some length to show that members of these political bodies have
33
incentives
incentives compatible
compatible with constitutional
constitutional enforcement.33
The trouble,
though, is that these incentives, to the extent that they in fact exist, are
34
creations of the thick constitution that Tushnet
creations
Tushnet disparages.34
If, as
Tushnet claims, the thick constitution
constitution does not warrant our respect and
obedience, then the present shape of these institutions
institutions should be up for
institutions-a Senate
grabs. It is not hard to imagine
imagine a different
different set of institutions-a
Senate
with seats distributed
proportional
to
population,
or
a
federal
system
distributed
population,
system of
of
example-that would
recall, referendum, and initiative, for example-that
would be more
compatible with populist constitutionalism. When Tushnet asks us to
compatible
himself
support the real institutions we presently have, he is aligning himself
with an unjust and anti-populist status quo.
The problems run still deeper. Suppose we had in place political
will" as itit
institutions that more accurately
accurately reflected
reflected the "popular
"popular will"
suppose that this will exists
presently exists. It is a large mistake to suppose
independent
it-or, at
independent of a matrix of power
power and suppression that forms it--or,
least, so the left has traditionally argued.
supra note 2, at 95-128.
33. See TUSHNET,
TuSHNET, supra
34. The
The thick constitution not only establishes
establishes the incentives
incentives that Tushnet depends
depends
upon, but also provides rules for the creation
creation of the authoritative
authoritative political acts to which he
would defer. This fact creates
creates serious conceptual
conceptual problems
problems for his thesis. How are courts
courts
supposed to defer
defer to the political branches without consulting and enforcing constitutional
provisions that determine when these branches
branches are appropriately
appropriately acting in their official
generally Matthew D. Adler &
Existence
capacity? See generally
& Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional
Constitutional Existence
Conditions and
and Judicial
JudicialReview, 89 VA.
Conditions
VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
(2003).
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Historically, the argument
argument has taken two forms. One tradition
claims that it is naive and romantic
romantic to believe that there is such a thing as
expression of popular will independent
a pure expression
independent of omnipresent assertions
assertions
of power. A more optimistic tradition claims that an inherently
inherently good
human nature would emerge
emerge if only the yoke of domination were
removed.
Whichever tradition one adheres to, few self-respecting
self-respecting leftists
would claim that political outcomes under present conditions should
should be
treated at face value. One need not associate oneself
oneself with all the
excesses produced by the doctrine of "false
consciousness" to see that
"false consciousness"
many of these results are a reflection
reflection of,
of, rather than a determinant of,
of,
current
of
current economic and political
political arrangements.
arrangements. For example,
example, the kind of
constitutional law "the
constitutional
"the people" of the United
United States will currently
currently favor
is surely heavily influenced,
influenced, if not entirely determined by, the current
distribution of media ownership, current
current levels of education, our
methods of running and financing elections, and the current
current distribution
of economic power. If these background conditions
conditions were changed, "the
"the
people"
people" might well have very different constitutional
constitutional preferences.
preferences.
Taking
Taking those arrangements
arrangements as a given instead of problematizing
problematizing them is
deeply conservative.
It is true, of course, that Tushnet's thin constitution might permit
changes
changes in these background conditions. Importantly,
Importantly, however, the
changes would have to be accomplished
background conditions
changes
accomplished with the background
in place. And it is just these conditions
conditions that prevent the changes from
occurring. None of this is to say that change is impossible. Ultimately,
whatever
whatever the obstacles, it is always open to people
people to say that they have
had enough.
circumstances than in
enough. Still, change is more likely in some circumstances
others.
A constitutional
constitutional theory that valorizes existing political
conditions and the outcomes that these conditions produce does more to
conditions
entrench
entrench the status quo than change it.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION
IV. TUSHNET'S
TUSHNET' S SUBSTANTIVE

These difficulties
difficulties with Tushnet's argument suggest that I may be
misreading
Perhaps Tushnet is arguing
misreading it.
arguing for substantive
substantive
constitutionalism
constitutionalism after all. It is a little hard to take at face value the
convincing leftists of
claim that the many pages
pages of the book devoted
devoted to convincing
of
the virtues of his proposal
conservative
proposal are really also intended for conservative
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35
eyes.
Moreover, the book contains several hints-albeit
eyes?5
hints-albeit no more than
hints-that Tushnet's proposal is intended to further a particular
particular version
36
of substantive
justice.
It is striking, for example, how tentative
substantive justice?6
tentative
Tushnet's
Tushnet's embrace of populist constitutionalism is. At one point, he
suggests that his support for abolition of judicial
judicial review is highly
37
contingent.
contingent,37
At another point, he suggests that he is not really
supporting abolition at all, but rather only serious thought about the
38 These passages
possibility
possibility of abolition. 38
passages at least hint at the possibility
that his embrace
contingent on it having
embrace of populist
populist constitutionalism
constitutionalism is contingent
beneficial
beneficial effects.
Other passages suggest somewhat more explicitly
explicitly that he is
advocating
substantive constitution. Consider, for example, the
advocating a substantive
following statement:

The very structure of judicial
judicial review in the United States thrusts the "Who
"Who
benefits" question to the fore. More generally: Judicial
Judicial review is an institution
institution
defended except
except by
designed to help us run a good government. It cannot be defended

35. It must be noted as well that Tushnet's book is one of numerous
numerous works
works written
written by
by
people on the left celebrating the virtues of nonjudicial
nonjudicial constitutionalism
constitutionalism at an historical
moment when the left has less power
power on the Supreme Court than it has had in generations.
CONSTITUTIONALISM
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER,
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
THEMSELVES: POPULAR
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
& Reva B. Siegel, Protecting
Protecting the Constitution
Constitution
AND
REVIEW (2004); Robert
Robert C. Post &
from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions
Section Five
Five Power,
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1I (2003);
People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section
Core of
Case Against Judicial
JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
of the Case
Jeremy Waldron,
Waldron, The Core
supra notes 19 & 20.
36. See supra
audience that he knows is progressive, much
much of the
When Tushnet writes
writes for an audience
ambiguity falls away and he argues in a straight-forward
straight-forward fashion that we should
should abolish
judicial review because abolition
abolition is good
good for the left. See Mark Tushnet, Democracy
Democracy Versus
Judicial
59,
available
at
Judicial
Review,
DISSENT,
Spring
2005,
available
at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=248.
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/articlel?article=248.
37. Tushnet writes:
If we accepted
If
accepted the controversial
controversial empirical judgments
judgments about
about how the political
political
system actually
actually operates,
operates, and
if we thought that a stable
if
stable constitutional system could be founded on such
judgments,
judgments, and
if we were able
ifwe
able to free ourselves from our obsession with courts, and
if we paid
ifwe
paid attention
attention to the thin Constitution
Constitution of the Declaration's
Declaration's principles,
principles,
self-enforcing Constitution
then we would find that the idea of a self-enforcing
Constitution describes an
attractive way of distributing
distributing constitutional
constitutional responsibility
responsibility throughout the
government.
TUSHNET,
TUSHNET, supra
supra note 2, at 128.
128.
38. "Populist constitutional law seeks
seeks to distribute constitutional responsibility
throughout the population. Thinking about a world without judicial review, toting up the
costs and benefits of the institution, may contribute to that goal. A modest conclusion,
conclusion,
academic's analysis can provide."
Id. at 174.
perhaps, but probably the only one an academic's
provide." [d.
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operates-whether in fact the government is better with it than
seeing how it operates-whether
39
without it.
it.

Surely, it has not escaped Tushnet's
Tushnet's attention that in a heterogeneous
disagreement about what constitutes "good
society, there will be disagreement
government." As he himself acknowledges,
government."
acknowledges, "[t]he
"[t]he real question is
legislatures or courts make more, and more
whether .. .. .. in general
general legislatures
40 But
important, constitutional
constitutional mistakes."
mistakes.'.40
we cannot evaluate
evaluate whether a
court or legislature
legislature has made a mistake without a substantive
substantive theory.
Tushnet is therefore right in asserting that "we must have a decent theory
interpretation
outside the courts even to be able to pose
of constitutional
constitutional interpretation
4
that as a question."'
question.,,41
If we take Tushnet as advancing
advancing a substantive theory, then what are
we to make of his disclaimers?
disclaimers? I cannot be sure, but I think it possible to
read his book as a strategic intervention
intervention designed
designed to make the best of a
very bad situation. On this reading, Tushnet as leftist confronts
confronts a
political culture extremely hostile to progressive change. Absent armed
armed
revolt, the only hope for rearranging institutions to promote
promote leftist causes
is to convince the conservatives
conservatives presently
presently in power that they have
nothing to fear from this rearrangement. In effect, Tushnet tells these
conservatives that they can have their cake and eat it too. They, too, can
conservatives
constitutionalism
be on the side of the people by endorsing
endorsing populist constitutionalism
without actually having to give up any of their prerogatives.
prerogatives. Populist
Populist
constitutionalism, he insists, is political rather
constitutionalism,
rather than substantive; its
embrace does nothing
nothing to tilt the playing field one way or the other.
Of course, Tushnet, as a leftist, does not himself believe
believe this; if he
did, he would have no reason to make the argument. He must
nonetheless
nonetheless make his constitutionalism
constitutionalism appear substantively neutral to
get his substantive opponents to buy into his argument.
Tushnet's
To be clear, I have no way to know whether
whether this is in fact Tushnet's
strategy. Whether
it
is
or
not,
though,
we
need
to
evaluate
it
Whether
evaluate to decide
whether
whether his proposals
proposals can qualify as both constitutionalist
constitutionalist and leftist.
What, then, are we to make of the strategy?
strategy?
Most obviously, it puts on the table important issues about candor.
Is it right to advance
constitutionalism in bad
advance an argument
argument for populist constitutionalism
faith? Writing more than twenty years
years ago, Paul Carrington
Carrington accused
"train[ing] crooks"
advocates of Critical Legal Studies (C.L.S.) of "train[ing]
crooks" and
advocates

39.
40.
41.
41.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
TUSHNET,
TUSHNET,

supra note 2, at 57.
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'' 2
teaching "the
"the skills of corruption: bribery
bribery and intimidation.
intimidation.'.42
In the
overheated atmosphere of the time, Carrington's opponents
overheated
opponents were quick
43 In retrospect, though, I wonder
to express
express outrage at the charge.43
whether
whether they should have displayed it as a badge of honor. With
45 they might have suggested
Michael Walzer
Borges,45
suggested
Walzer44 and Jorge Luis Borges,
that dirty hands are the mark of courage and commitment. A willingness
to sacrifice
sacrifice even one's own integrity for the sake of the cause
cause is what it
means to give true primacy to leftist goals.
authentically leftist.
If this is indeed Tushnet's
Tushnet's project, then it is authentically
subordinate
Unlike the position of political constitutionalists, it does not subordinate
leftist ends to other values. The trouble, though, is that it is not a
constitutional project. Carrington's
constitutional
Carrington's anger
anger and panic were triggered by
(correctly, in my judgment) that
C.L.S. precisely because he understood (correctly,
it refused to subordinate substantive
substantive justice
justice to rule of law values.
Obviously, this failure is inconsistent
inconsistent with political
political constitutionalism.
Indeed, Tushnet concedes as much when he says in his introduction that
"'mere'
in order to count as constitutional
constitutional law, his proposal
proposal must not be '''mere'
''
46
politics, nor is it 'simply'
'simply' philosophy.
philosophy.'.46 Perhaps
Perhaps less obviously, bad
faith arguments are also inconsistent with the brand of substantive
constitutionalism that Tushnet
constitutionalism
Tushnet advocates. If the people
people are, indeed, to
as
capable
rule, then presumably, they should be treated
treated
capable of autonomous
autonomous
choice. In other words, they should be accorded the respect
respect that bad
faith manipulation
manipulation denies them.
Of course, saying that the strategy
strategy is in tension with
is
not
to
say
that
it
is
wrong. Perhaps we should
constitutionalism
constitutionalism
should be
leftists rather than constitutionalists.
constitutionalists. But if one is really going to get
one's hands dirty, then at least one should have something to show for
the effort. On the level of strategy, I am very doubtful that populist
constitutionalism is in fact the best means to advance us toward the goals
constitutionalism
of the left.
We have already explored one problem with the strategy. Under
Under
present conditions,
themselves"conditions, it is far from obvious that "the people themselves"-

and the River,
42. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and
River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
EDUC. 222,
222, 227 (1984).
(1984).
and Academic
43. See Peter W. Martin, Of Law and the River,
River, and of Nihilism
Nihilism and
(1985) (collecting correspondence
correspondence in response
Freedom,
Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL. EDUC. I1 (1985)
response to
to
Carrington's article).
Carrington's
article).
& PUB.
PUB.
PoliticalAction:
Action: The Problem
Problem of
Dirty Hands,
44. See Michael
44.
Michael Walzer, Political
of Dirty
Hands, 2 PHIL. &
AFFAIRS 160 (1973).
(1973).
Three Versions
Versions of Judas,
LABYRINTHS: SELECTED
45. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, Three
Judas, in LABYRINTHS:
SELECTED
1962).
WRITINGS 95 (Donald A. Yates &
& James
STORIES AND
STORIES
AND OTHER WRITINGS
James E. Irby
Irby eds.,
eds., 1962).
TUSHNET, supra
supra note 2, at xi.
46. TuSHNET,
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political institutions that mayor
represent
or, more precisely, political
may or may not represent
"the
themselves"-will favor the programs
"the people
people themselves"-will
programs of the left. Tushnet
Tushnet
responds to this problem by pointing out that we need to make
comparative
comparative judgments. He couples this response with a deflationary
account of the history
history of judicial review. Together with many other
account
scholars, 47 he is rightly skeptical of the claim that courts have often or
scholars,47
successfully defended the disempowered.
advocates of judicial
disempowered. Leftist advocates
review
make
the
mistake
of
imagining
a
court
populated
by the justices
review
imagining
they would choose. But there has not been, and will not be, such a court.
of
Rather than waste resources on trying to produce
produce the deus ex machina
machina of
of
a leftist court, Tushnet urges progressives to do the hard work of
building political support for their programs.
Tushnet
comparative
Tushnet is right to insist that we need to make comparative
judgments, but I think that the comparison
comparison actually
actually cuts the other way.
Yes, it is hard to imagine the sudden emergence
emergence of a leftist court, but it
is even harder to imagine that Tushnet's proposal to take the
Constitution away from the courts will be put in place.4488 In making this
acknowledging that any strategy designed
comparison, we must start by acknowledging
to create progressive
change
is
a long shot. Still, I think that Tushnet
progressive
underestimates both the difficulty in securing the adoption of his
program and the potential for judicial review.
Consider first the possibility that current political
political institutions might
actually take the Constitution away from the courts. How likely is it that
this will come about any time soon? Tushnet imagines the Justices
power,49 but everything
everything that we know about
abandoning their own power,49
human nature and political actors makes this highly unlikely. Are the
other branches
branches likely to take the power from them? For reasons that are
admittedly difficult to understand, the Supreme Court remains
remains the most

47.
See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
See,
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
CAN COURTS
COURTS BRING
Civil
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
CHANGE? (1991);
(1991); Michael
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv.
REV. I1 (1996).
(1996).
Libenies
48. Tushnet himself provides reasons why "[fjinding
"[finding the political support for [proposals
[proposals
.... likely to be quite difficult."
difficult." TUSHNET, supra
supra note 2,
2, at 172.
to abolish judicial
judicial review] is ....
As he points out, effectuating
effectuating his proposal would
would require
require a talented political
political leader, who might
might
beneficiaries of Supreme
Supreme Court
not emerge. Moreover,
Moreover, people
people see themselves
themselves as potential
potential beneficiaries
Supreme Court. And
losses in the Supreme
And
rulings, and this hope may
may blind them to the possibility of losses
even if judicial
judicial review harms a given
given political group on balance, at a particular moment, it
may be helping some
some members of that group, and these members will see proposals for
Id.
abolition as a threat. Id.
49. See TUSHNET,
supra note 2, at 154.
TUSHNET, supra
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country. 50 In the teeth of the
popular governmental institution
institution in the country.50
incompetence, venality, and pomposity, Americans
current Court's incompetence,
Americans
continue to prefer judges to legislators
legislators and presidents.
If I have correctly identified
identified Tushnet's strategy, he imagines that
somehow the people who presently hold power can be tricked
somehow
tricked into
relinquishing it by the claim that populist constitutionalism is politically
accomplishment at
neutral. Even if they are so convinced, however, that accomplishment
best eliminates one strand of conservative opposition. It does nothing to
infatuation with courts.
change America's
America's baseline infatuation
courtS.5 51 . Moreover, it is
always a mistake
mistake to imagine that our opponents are stupid. For reasons
outlined above, I have doubts that populist
populist constitutionalism
constitutionalism tilts
leftward, but assuming arguendo
arguendo that it does, conservatives
conservatives are just as
able to perceive
perceive the tilt as are progressives.
progressives. Why, then, would they agree
to it?
Oddly, in this regard, Tushnet makes the same mistake that he
accuses his opponents
opponents of making. Like his opponents, he starts by
imagining a political alignment where his proposal would be plausible.
But if there were such an alignment, the proposal would not be
necessary in the first place.
Progressives make this same mistake when they propose procedural
procedural
changes like campaign
campaign finance reform. It may be true that if only we
had fair financing of elections,
elections, it would be possible
possible to enact progressive
legislation. But the same forces that block the progressive legislation
also block meaningful
meaningful campaign
campaign finance reform. Occasionally,
Occasionally, a
coalition can be formed that creates procedural
procedural reform when it would
would be
impossible to assemble
assemble a coalition that backs the substantive
substantive changes
made possible by the procedural
procedural reform. More often, though, people
understand that procedures have substantive
substantive consequences, and those
people
are
unwilling
to
agree
to
procedural
people
unwilling
agree
procedural changes
changes that are likely to
produce substantive outcomes
outcomes they oppose. Given this fact, and as
50. Although
Although confidence
confidence in the Supreme
Supreme Court has been declining along
along with
confidence
confidence in all institutions
institutions of government,
government, the Court remains far ahead
ahead of Congress and the
Presidency.
indicated 34% of Americans voicing a "great
Presidency. Polling data reported in June, 2007 indicated
deal"
"quite a lot" of confidence in the Supreme
deal" or "quite
Supreme Court, as compared to 25%
25% voicing similar
views of the Presidency,
14% voicing similar
Presidency, and 14%
similar views of Congress.
Congress. See Frank Newport,
Americans' Confidence in Congress
Congress at
at All-Time Low; Confidence
Confidence in Most Institutions
Drops,
Institutions Drops,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27946/Americans-Confidence-CongressGALLUP, June
June 21,
21, 2007,
2007, http://www.gallup.comlpoIU27946/
Americans-Confidence-CongressAllTime-Low.aspx.
AIITime-Low.aspx.
51.
51. Even
Even Larry Kramer, a strong defender
defender of popular constitutionalism,
constitutionalism, concedes
concedes that
"[p]ublic
constitutional law and politics."
"[p]ublic acceptance
acceptance of judicial
judicial supremacy
supremacy pervades constitutional
politics."
KRAMER,
"trying to build opposition
KRAMER, supra
supra note 35, at 233. Accordingly, "trying
opposition to the Court by
decrying
decrying judicial
judicial supremacy will not go down
down well with most Americans."
Americans." Id.
/d. at 232.
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difficult as the fight may
may be, it makes
makes sense for progressives
progressives to use their
their
difficult
change people's
people's minds
minds about their
their substantive
substantive
scarce resources
resources to change
scarce
programs rather
rather than to fight procedural
programs
procedural battles,
battles, whether
whether they be
be over
over
campaign
campaign finance
finance or
or the
the power of judges.
judges.
For these
these reasons,
reasons, I think
think that the
the prospects
prospects of taking the
the
constitution away
away from the courts are less encouraging
encouraging than Tushnet
constitution
imagines. What about the complementary
complementary prospect
prospect of putting
putting in
in place
place a
imagines.
leftist
leftist Court?
Court? This
This too is an uphill
uphill fight to say
say the least. Tushnet
Tushnet is
is right
that the
the history of judicial
judicial review
review offers little in the way
way of
of
to claim that
encouragement. But although the prospects
prospects are
are surely
surely bleak, there are
encouragement.
reasons to think that the odds of seeing
seeing a leftist
leftist Court
Court are better than the
the
reasons
odds of Tushnet's
Tushnet' s strategy
strategy succeeding.
succeeding.
odds
The main reason for optimism
optimism is that the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court is
is
populated
populated by only nine people
people who are appointed
appointed for life. True, the
the
appointment and
chance
chance of an authentic
authentic leftist surviving
surviving the appointment
change
over time,
but
people
confirmation
process is close to zero,
people
confirmation process
especially when political
political pressures
pressures are removed. It is worth pondering
pondering
especially
the fact that perhaps the most radical, independent,
independent, and iconoclastic
iconoclastic
Court's history-William
history-William 0.
O. Douglas-began
Douglas-began his judicial
justice in the Court's
without a well-defined
jurist
cautious
career as a politically
politically cautious
well-defined
52
jurisprudential philosophy.
philosophy.52 No other
other justice has moved
moved as far left as
jurisprudential
Douglas, but there
there are many other examples-Harry
examples-Harry Blackmun,
Blackmun, John
Paul Stevens, and David
David Souter come to mind-of justices who have
ended up being more progressive
progressive than they were thought to be at the
time of their confirmation. Is it really impossible that five people might
undergo such a transformation
transformation at the same time?
Even if the Court turned strongly left, it is not at all clear that it
could actually
actually put in place a leftist program. As many others have
pointed out, the Court's power is sharply constrained
constrained and its very few
efforts to effect meaningful social change have had, at best, mixed
53 Once again, though, we have to ask the "compared
"compared to what"
results.53
52. During his early years on the bench, Douglas
Douglas was preoccupied
preoccupied with positioning
positioning
MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY,
himself to become President. See BRUCE
"showed little interest in developing a
0. DOUGLAS 203-21 (2003). He "showed
LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
philosophy," and decided issues raised in cases based on "his own
long-term jurisprudential philosophy,"
Id. at 201-02.
best interests" and "his political
political future."
future." [d.
201-02.
Cf Jane S.
53. See generally
generally ROSENBERG,
ROSENBERG, supra note 47; Klarman, supra note 47. Cj
Courts, 54
54 Drake L. Rev. 861,
Change, and
and the
the Courts,
Sexual Orientation,
Orientation, Social Change,
Schacter, Sexual
861, 863
countermajoritarian
("[Although] any romanticized picture
(2006) ("[Although]
picture of judges as countermajoritarian
empirically
single-handedly making public policy more progressive, is empirically
revolutionaries, single-handedly
.... The notion that the institutional properties of courts disable them from ever
unsustainable ....
caricatured qualities.").
driving social change in a significant way has its own caricatured
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question. It is not just the Court, but progressive politicians as well, who
have failed to prevent the slide into oligarchy and imperialism. Judges
have at their disposal the myth of constitutional obligation that
substantial good use of
politicians lack. A judge so inclined might make substantial
a rhetoric and mystique that continues
continues to have a hold on the American
people.
self-conscious choices of politicians
It is doubtless the case that the self-conscious
judges
or
produce
produce little social reform. It is most often the unintended
consequences
migrations, and
consequences of large scale social forces-of
forces--of wars, migrations,
54
changes
Romanticizing either judicial review
changes in material conditions.54
or political mobilization is surely a mistake. My claim, then, is very
modest: if we are to choose between politicians and judges, there is no
good reason to count judges out, especially
especially in a world where judicial
review is already in place and where it will take a great deal of effort to
dislodge it.
V. OUR
CONSTITUTION
OUR UTOPIAN CONSTITUTION

Tushnet's failed effort at a leftist constitutionalism
constitutionalism puts the
question to us: if we must choose between
between constitutionalism and leftism,
what choice
confirm the cliche,
clichr, I
choice should we make? As much as I hate to conflIl11
must say that as I grow older, I become more ambivalent about the right
answer. I have a friend who refers to herself as a "retired Marxist."
Marxist." I
55
know what she means. Being a real leftist is a full time job.55
It requires
courage, commitment,
commitment, sacrifice,
sacrifice, and an endless appetite for lost causes.
54. See,
See, e.g., MICHAEL
KLARMAN, FROM JIM
54.
MICHAEL J.
J. KLARMAN,
JIM CROW
CROW TO
TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
SUPREME
COURT AND
AND THE STRUGGLE
STRUGGLE FOR
FOR RACIAL
RACIAL EQUALITY
EQUALITY 174 (2004) ("World
("World War
War I's
II's
contribution to progressive
contribution
progressive racial change
change cannot
cannot be
be overstated.
overstated. Earlier
Earlier wars had had
had similarly
similarly
egalitarian consequences.").
consequences.").
egalitarian
55. Cf.
Cf. IRVING HOWE, STEADY WORK (1966).
epigraph to Howe's book wryly
(1966). The
The epigraph
wryly
evokes
evokes the quixotic patience
patience that
that is necessary
necessary for left utopianism--a
utopianism-a patience
patience that, if we are
not very careful, shades into passivity and irrelevance:
irrelevance:
Once in Chelm, the mythical
mythical village of the East
East European
European Jews,
Jews, aa man was
appointed
Messiah. He
He
appointed to
to sit
sit at
at the
the village
village gate
gate and wait for
for the coming
coming of the Messiah.
complained
"You are
complained to the village elders that
that his pay was
was too
too low. "You
are right,"
right," they
they
said to him,
him, "the
"the pay is low. But
But consider:
consider: the work
work is steady."
steady."
Id. at
"steady work"
[d.
at iv. For Howe
Howe himself, however, "steady
work" meant something quite
quite different.
different. As
As his
friend
friend and colleague,
colleague, Michael
Michael Walzer,
Walzer, wrote
wrote upon
upon Howe's
Howe's death:
I often
often asked myself:
myself: why did
did aa man
man of such
such high
high talent, so cultured,
cultured, so
so
insightful,
insightful, who
who used
used the English language
language with such power,
power, devote
devote himself
himself for
forty
... political/diplomatic/editorial
forty years,
years, day
day in,
in, day
day out
out to
to ...
politicaUdiplomatic/editorial drudgery?
drudgery? Why the
the
endless
endless phone
phone calls?...
calls? ... Why the
the constant fund
fund raising, which
which he was
was never good
good at
and
suggesting
and certainly never
never enjoyed?
enjoyed? Why
Why the stream
stream of notes
notes and
and postcards,
postcards, suggesting
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Perhaps
Perhaps more to the point, being a leftist means always being a pain
in the ass. A political
political constitution
constitution provides a way for people to get
along with each other. It is a template for political
political pluralism
pluralism that allows
for the possibility
possibility of companionship
companionship and common ground among people
who might otherwise be at each other's throats. These are large virtues,
especially given the fact that foregoing them would barely increase
increase the
dismal chances for large-scale
large-scale social change
change in any event.
There are days-many of them-when I am drawn to these virtues.
And yet I cannot
cannot quite shake my commitment to the left. I think of my
own leftism
leftism (on the days, that is, when I think of myself as a leftist at all)
involuntary temperamental
temperamental disposition
as consisting
consisting of a more or less involuntary
rather than allegiance to any real program. Being a leftist in this sense is
temperamentally drawn to permanent
being temperamentally
permanent critique. It is never
never having a
home, always being dissatisfied, always haunted by the knowledge
knowledge that
the wrong people have power and that things are not as they should be.
This sort of leftist temperament leads to a paradox,
paradox, which, in turn,
might explain
explain why Tushnet's constitutionalism is leftist after all. A
frequent charge leveled against leftists of this sort is that they lack a
positive program.5566 The paradox is that a positive program is actually
permanent critique-albeit
necessary to sustain permanent
critique-albeit the program
program must be one
one
important
that can never
never be achieved. Leftist utopianism provides
provides an important
motivation for critique. To imagine a goal that might actually be
permanence of the criticism. To concede that
achieved is to give up the permanence
alternative is to
one has no goal at all is to slide into cynicism. The only alternative
adhere to a goal that is forever out of reach, all the while claiming-to
oneself and to others-that, if only we hang together and are strong, we
can reach it after all.

projects, reminding us of deadlines, hammered
hammered out one after another, every day,
while the essays he wanted to write and the books he wanted to read lay
waiting? .....
The answer is the man, a man of the left and a socialist, who knew that this
work, exactly this work, was what
what we were here for, that we did not have to finish
it but could not give it up, that someone had to pay attention
attention even to the smallest
smallest
matters-and if someone, then us, then him.
Michael
275, 276. Although
Although
Michael Walzer, Irving Howe: 1920-1993, DISSENT, Summer 1993, at 275,
Walzer was describing Howe's
Dissent, he might well have been
been
Howe's years of service as editor of Dissent,
speaking
secretary to the Conference
Conference of Legal Studies,
to
speaking of Tushnet's
Tushnet's years of service as secretary
Studies, not to
mention
mention his work in thankless jobs like Associate
Associate Dean of the Georgetown
Georgetown University
University Law
Center and President of the Association
Association of American Law Schools. Both men understood
understood that
revolutions
organization as well as spontaneity, attention to
revolutions require selflessness
selflessness as well as ego, organization
detail as well as to vision.
56. See, e.g., Carrington,
Carrington, supra
supra note 42, at 227.
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Perhaps this leftist utopian vision provides the best way to
understand Tushnet's constitutionalism. I have been treating it as a
serious proposal, which is, of course, how Tushnet treats it, and how
utopians must always treat their own proposals. But perhaps
perhaps this is a
misunderstanding of what the proposal is all about. Returning
Returning the
misunderstanding
Constitution to the people is not something that actually will be-that
we would actually want to be-achieved. It is, instead, a platform on
power to
which we can stand so as to see over the heads of those now in power
an imagined
imagined world where the corruption, evil, and obfuscation that are
the hallmarks of modern,
modem, mainstream
mainstream constitutionalism
constitutionalism no longer exist.
deficiencies in our current situation-seeing
Seeing the deficiencies
situation-seeing them
them
unsparingly-is surely leftist. Imagining a different
different world
world
clearly and unsparingly-is
of
might also be taken to be constitutionalist,
constitutionalist, not in the ordinary sense of
the word, but in the sense that religious
millenarianism
is
constitutional.
religious millenarianism
People can be constituted
constituted by such imaginings. One can organize a mode
of living around a commitment
commitment to critique and to the hypothetical
hypothetical world
that grounds the critique.
Such a commitment can provide rules of conduct and a basis for
cooperation with others who share the same vision. That is certainly
certainly not
constitutionalism that mainstream
mainstream theorists talk about, but it is
the sort of constitutionalism
not nothing either; and it is, perhaps, all that we can expect of a
constitutionalism that is authentically
authentically leftist.
constitutionalism
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